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Two behavioral phenotypes exist in a population of male side-blotched lizards competing for territory: aggressive territorial defenders ('Hawks') and display-only ritualizers ('Doves'). When two individuals contest a breeding rock worth a fitness value of V=40 fitness unitsV = 40\text{ fitness units}, two Doves resolve the contest peacefully such that each gains an average payoff of V2=20 fitness units\frac{V}{2} = 20\text{ fitness units}. If a Hawk encounters a Dove, the Hawk claims the territory, gaining V=40 fitness unitsV = 40\text{ fitness units} while the Dove gets 0 fitness units0\text{ fitness units}. When two Hawks contest the territory, they fight until serious injury occurs, yielding an expected payoff of V−C2\frac{V - C}{2}, where CC represents the fitness cost of injury. Natural selection establishes an evolutionarily stable mixed equilibrium where the frequency of Hawks is p∗=VCp^* = \frac{V}{C} whenever C>VC > V. Determine the exact critical threshold value of injury cost CcritC_{\text{crit}} below which the Hawk strategy becomes an evolutionarily stable pure strategy (p∗=1.00p^* = 1.00), and calculate the equilibrium frequency of Hawks p∗p^* when C=160 fitness unitsC = 160\text{ fitness units}.

Answer and steps

Final answer

Critical threshold cost Ccrit=40.0 fitness unitsC_{\text{crit}} = 40.0\text{ fitness units} (or C≤40.0 fitness unitsC \le 40.0\text{ fitness units}), and at C=160 fitness unitsC = 160\text{ fitness units}, the equilibrium frequency of Hawks is p∗=0.250p^* = 0.250.

Steps

01

Understanding the Evolutionary Dynamics of the Hawk-Dove Contest

In evolutionary game theory, the fitness payoff of each behavioral strategy depends on the frequency of other strategies in the population:

  • Dove against Dove: Resolves peacefully without injury, sharing the breeding rock equally: E(Dove,Dove)=V2E(\text{Dove}, \text{Dove}) = \frac{V}{2}
  • Hawk against Dove: The Hawk takes the resource uncontested: E(Hawk,Dove)=V,E(Dove,Hawk)=0E(\text{Hawk}, \text{Dove}) = V, \quad E(\text{Dove}, \text{Hawk}) = 0
  • Hawk against Hawk: Both fight until one is injured: E(Hawk,Hawk)=V−C2E(\text{Hawk}, \text{Hawk}) = \frac{V - C}{2}

02

Determining the Critical Threshold Cost (CcritC_{\text{crit}})

A strategy is an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) in pure form if no mutant or alternative strategy can invade a population consisting entirely of that type.

For a population of pure Hawks (p=1p = 1) to be stable against invasion by Doves:

  • An invading Dove receives E(Dove,Hawk)=0E(\text{Dove}, \text{Hawk}) = 0.
  • A resident Hawk encounters other Hawks and receives E(Hawk,Hawk)=V−C2E(\text{Hawk}, \text{Hawk}) = \frac{V - C}{2}.

For pure Hawk to be stable (p∗=1.00p^* = 1.00), a Hawk must perform at least as well as an invading Dove: V−C2≥0  ⟹  V≥C  ⟹  C≤V\frac{V - C}{2} \ge 0 \implies V \ge C \implies C \le V

When the injury cost CC is strictly less than or equal to the resource value VV, the cost of fighting never outweighs the prize, so aggressive territorial defense always pays off.

Given V=40 fitness unitsV = 40\text{ fitness units}, the critical threshold cost below which Hawk becomes a pure ESS is: Ccrit=V=40.0 fitness unitsC_{\text{crit}} = V = 40.0\text{ fitness units}

(Below or at C≤40.0 fitness unitsC \le 40.0\text{ fitness units}, p∗=1.00p^* = 1.00.)


03

Calculating the Equilibrium Frequency When C=160 fitness unitsC = 160\text{ fitness units}

When the cost of injury exceeds the value of the territory (C>VC > V), fighting becomes dangerous enough that a pure Hawk population is vulnerable to invasion by peaceful Doves. Selection then maintains a balanced polymorphism (mixed ESS) where the average payoffs of Hawks and Doves are equalized:

p∗=VCp^* = \frac{V}{C}

Substitute the given values into the equilibrium formula:

  • V=40 fitness unitsV = 40\text{ fitness units}
  • C=160 fitness unitsC = 160\text{ fitness units}

p∗=40160=14=0.250p^* = \frac{40}{160} = \frac{1}{4} = 0.250

Thus, at an injury cost of 160 fitness units160\text{ fitness units}, natural selection stabilizes the population at 25.0%25.0\% Hawks and 75.0%75.0\% Doves.


Pitfall to Avoid

A common error is confusing the payoff of sharing the resource (V2=20\frac{V}{2} = 20) with the full resource value (V=40V = 40) when setting the invasion threshold. The critical condition for an invading Dove is compared against 00 (the payoff of a Dove facing a Hawk), not against V2\frac{V}{2}, leading directly to Ccrit=VC_{\text{crit}} = V.

Typical errors

OverviewACEpath Teacher's Diagnosis

01 The student inverts the ratio in the frequency formula by computing C/V instead of V/C.

Sample Student Work

Reviewed by ACEpath Teacher
Step-by-Step Review
Walk Through It with Your Teacher
Partially correct
  1. Step 1

    p∗=1 when C=V  ⟹  Ccrit=40 fitness unitsp^* = 1 \text{ when } C = V \implies C_{\text{crit}} = 40\text{ fitness units}

  2. Step 2

    p∗=CV  ⟹  p∗=16040=4.00p^* = \frac{C}{V} \implies p^* = \frac{160}{40} = 4.00

    Correct

    p∗=VC=40160=0.250p^* = \frac{V}{C} = \frac{40}{160} = 0.250

    You inverted the equilibrium ratio by calculating CV\frac{C}{V} instead of VC\frac{V}{C}. Because p∗p^* represents an allele or phenotype frequency in the population, it must lie between 00 and 11.

WHAT YOU DID WELL
Compliments from Your Teacher

You correctly identified that the critical cost threshold occurs where C=VC = V.

You stated the correct numerical value and units for Ccrit=40 fitness unitsC_{\text{crit}} = 40\text{ fitness units}.

THE ERROR
Where Your ACEpath Teacher Spotted the Mistake
Inverted frequency ratio

no

WHY IT HAPPENED
ACEpath Teacher's Diagnosis

You inverted the formula for the mixed ESS frequency by writing p∗=CVp^* = \frac{C}{V} instead of p∗=VCp^* = \frac{V}{C}, and did not perform a boundary check that a population frequency must satisfy 0≤p∗≤10 \le p^* \le 1.

REASONING PATH
Your ACEpath teacher’s suggested approach
Bounded Frequency Check
  • Any population frequency or proportion pp must satisfy 0≤p≤10 \le p \le 1.

  • Whenever you calculate an equilibrium frequency, immediately check whether your result exceeds 11.

Equilibrium Ratio Logic
  • When the cost of fighting increases (C>VC > V), fighting becomes less advantageous, so the frequency of aggressive Hawks must decrease (p∗=VC<1p^* = \frac{V}{C} < 1).

  • Confirm that the variable representing cost (CC) is in the denominator so that higher costs reduce aggressive behavior.

CORRECTED PATH
ACEpath Teacher's Demonstration
  1. Recall the mixed ESS formula given in the problem: p∗=VCp^* = \frac{V}{C} for C>VC > V.

  2. Substitute the resource value V=40V = 40 and injury cost C=160C = 160: p∗=40160p^* = \frac{40}{160}.

  3. Simplify the fraction: p∗=14=0.250p^* = \frac{1}{4} = 0.250.

Final answer

Ccrit=40.0 fitness unitsC_{\text{crit}} = 40.0\text{ fitness units}, p∗=0.250p^* = 0.250

NEXT STEPS
Final Takeaways from Your Teacher
  • Review the algebraic derivation of the Hawk-Dove mixed ESS to see why equalizing expected payoffs yields p∗=VCp^* = \frac{V}{C}.

  • Always perform a quick sanity check on calculated probabilities or frequencies to ensure they fall within the interval [0,1][0, 1].

OverviewACEpath Teacher's Diagnosis

02 The student uses the half-payoff value V/2 = 20 instead of the total territory value V = 40 in the formulas.

Sample Student Work

Reviewed by ACEpath Teacher
Step-by-Step Review
Walk Through It with Your Teacher
Incorrect
  1. Step 1

    p∗=V/2C=1  ⟹  Ccrit=20 fitness unitsp^* = \frac{V/2}{C} = 1 \implies C_{\text{crit}} = 20\text{ fitness units}

    Correct

    p∗=VC=1  ⟹  Ccrit=V=40 fitness unitsp^* = \frac{V}{C} = 1 \implies C_{\text{crit}} = V = 40\text{ fitness units}

    You set the equilibrium frequency equal to 11 to find the pure-strategy boundary, which is the right conceptual condition. However, the equilibrium frequency given in the problem is p∗=VCp^* = \frac{V}{C}, not V/2C\frac{V/2}{C}. Substituting the total resource value V=40 fitness unitsV = 40\text{ fitness units} gives Ccrit=40 fitness unitsC_{\text{crit}} = 40\text{ fitness units}.

  2. Step 2

    p∗=20160  ⟹  p∗=0.125p^* = \frac{20}{160} \implies p^* = 0.125

    Correct

    p∗=40160=0.250p^* = \frac{40}{160} = 0.250

    You correctly set up the ratio with C=160 fitness unitsC = 160\text{ fitness units} in the denominator, but you used V2=20\frac{V}{2} = 20 in the numerator rather than V=40V = 40. Using p∗=VC=40160p^* = \frac{V}{C} = \frac{40}{160} gives p∗=0.250p^* = 0.250.

WHAT YOU DID WELL
Compliments from Your Teacher

You correctly identified that the pure Hawk ESS threshold occurs where p∗=1p^* = 1.

You correctly substituted the cost value C=160 fitness unitsC = 160\text{ fitness units} into the denominator.

You accurately executed the arithmetic division 20160=0.125\frac{20}{160} = 0.125.

THE ERROR
Where Your ACEpath Teacher Spotted the Mistake
Payoff parameter confusion ($V$ vs. $V/2$)

no

WHY IT HAPPENED
ACEpath Teacher's Diagnosis

You confused the average shared payoff between two peaceful Doves (V2=20\frac{V}{2} = 20) with the total fitness value of the contested territory (V=40V = 40). In the Hawk-Dove model, the full value of winning the contested territory is VV, which appears directly in the numerator of the mixed-ESS formula p∗=VCp^* = \frac{V}{C}.

REASONING PATH
Your ACEpath teacher’s suggested approach
Identify Total Resource Value vs. Shared Payoff
  • In contest competition models, VV represents the full value of monopolizing the resource, while V2\frac{V}{2} is merely the average payoff when two non-aggressive competitors share it.

  • Check whether the model formula calls for the total prize value VV or an interaction-specific payoff.

Verify the Given ESS Formula
  • When a question specifies p∗=VCp^* = \frac{V}{C}, use the stated variable VV directly rather than modifying it to V2\frac{V}{2}.

  • Reread the problem statement to confirm the exact definition of variables in the equilibrium expression.

CORRECTED PATH
ACEpath Teacher's Demonstration
  1. Identify the total resource value: V=40 fitness unitsV = 40\text{ fitness units}.

  2. Set the equilibrium frequency to p∗=1.00p^* = 1.00 to find the critical boundary: VCcrit=1  ⟹  Ccrit=V=40.0 fitness units\frac{V}{C_{\text{crit}}} = 1 \implies C_{\text{crit}} = V = 40.0\text{ fitness units}.

  3. Calculate the equilibrium frequency when C=160 fitness unitsC = 160\text{ fitness units}: p∗=VC=40160=0.250p^* = \frac{V}{C} = \frac{40}{160} = 0.250.

Final answer

Ccrit=40.0 fitness unitsC_{\text{crit}} = 40.0\text{ fitness units}, and p∗=0.250p^* = 0.250

NEXT STEPS
Final Takeaways from Your Teacher
  • Review the payoff matrix of the Hawk-Dove game to see why the full resource value VV enters the ESS formula rather than V2\frac{V}{2}.

  • Practice distinguishing between total resource value (VV) and shared payoffs in evolutionary game theory questions.

OverviewACEpath Teacher's Diagnosis

03 The student misinterprets the Hawk-Hawk payoff expression (V - C)/2 = 0 as the condition for a pure Hawk ESS, resulting in C_crit = V/2.

Sample Student Work

Reviewed by ACEpath Teacher
Step-by-Step Review
Walk Through It with Your Teacher
Partially correct
  1. Step 1

    V−C2=0  ⟹  Ccrit=V2=20 fitness units\frac{V - C}{2} = 0 \implies C_{\text{crit}} = \frac{V}{2} = 20\text{ fitness units}

    Correct

    V−C2≥0  ⟹  C≤V  ⟹  Ccrit=V=40 fitness units\frac{V - C}{2} \ge 0 \implies C \le V \implies C_{\text{crit}} = V = 40\text{ fitness units}

    You correctly set the resident Hawk payoff equal to the invader Dove payoff of 00, but multiplying both sides of V−C2=0\frac{V - C}{2} = 0 by 22 gives V−C=0V - C = 0, which yields C=V=40 fitness unitsC = V = 40\text{ fitness units}, not V2\frac{V}{2}.

  2. Step 2

    p∗=VC=40160  ⟹  p∗=0.25p^* = \frac{V}{C} = \frac{40}{160} \implies p^* = 0.25

WHAT YOU DID WELL
Compliments from Your Teacher

You correctly used the mixed ESS frequency formula p∗=VCp^* = \frac{V}{C} to find the equilibrium frequency in part (b).

You correctly identified that pure Hawk stability occurs at the boundary where the Hawk-Hawk payoff V−C2\frac{V - C}{2} equals the payoff of an invading Dove (00).

THE ERROR
Where Your ACEpath Teacher Spotted the Mistake
Algebraic isolation error

You divided VV by 22 when clearing the fraction in V−C2=0\frac{V - C}{2} = 0, arriving at C=V2C = \frac{V}{2} instead of C=VC = V.

WHY IT HAPPENED
ACEpath Teacher's Diagnosis

When isolating CC from V−C2=0\frac{V - C}{2} = 0, you carried the denominator 22 over to VV as a division rather than clearing it by multiplying both sides by 22 (or setting the numerator directly to zero). Alternatively, setting p∗=VC=1p^* = \frac{V}{C} = 1 directly demonstrates that the boundary occurs when C=VC = V.

REASONING PATH
Your ACEpath teacher’s suggested approach
Clearing denominators in zero-product expressions
  • For any fraction A−Bk=0\frac{A - B}{k} = 0 with k≠0k \ne 0, multiply both sides by kk to obtain A−B=0A - B = 0, which means B=AB = A.

  • Multiply the entire equation by the denominator before isolating the variable.

Boundary condition check via $p^*$
  • The pure Hawk strategy boundary is defined by p∗=1.00p^* = 1.00.

  • Check your critical cost by setting VCcrit=1\frac{V}{C_{\text{crit}}} = 1, which confirms Ccrit=VC_{\text{crit}} = V.

CORRECTED PATH
ACEpath Teacher's Demonstration
  1. Multiply both sides by 22: V−C=0V - C = 0

  2. Add CC to both sides: Ccrit=VC_{\text{crit}} = V

  3. Substitute V=40 fitness unitsV = 40\text{ fitness units}: Ccrit=40 fitness unitsC_{\text{crit}} = 40\text{ fitness units}

Final answer

Ccrit=40 fitness unitsC_{\text{crit}} = 40\text{ fitness units} (or C≤40 fitness unitsC \le 40\text{ fitness units}), p∗=0.25p^* = 0.25

NEXT STEPS
Final Takeaways from Your Teacher
  • Double-check algebraic solutions of rational equations by setting the numerator directly equal to zero when the expression equals zero.

  • Cross-verify the critical value using the alternate condition p∗=VCcrit=1p^* = \frac{V}{C_{\text{crit}}} = 1.

Lock it in

Similar question

01

In a population of spiders contesting webs worth V=50 fitness unitsV = 50\text{ fitness units}, aggressive fighters incur an injury cost of C=200 fitness unitsC = 200\text{ fitness units} when fighting each other. Calculate the evolutionarily stable frequency of aggressive fighters (p∗p^*).

Answer

p∗=0.250p^* = 0.250. Use the mixed ESS formula p∗=VC=50200=0.250p^* = \frac{V}{C} = \frac{50}{200} = 0.250.

02

Two red deer stags compete for a mating territory of value V=60 fitness unitsV = 60\text{ fitness units}. Escalated fights carry an injury cost of C=150 fitness unitsC = 150\text{ fitness units}. Determine the equilibrium proportion of peaceful displayers (Doves) in this population.

Answer

Proportion of Doves is 0.6000.600. First, find the Hawk frequency: p∗=VC=60150=0.400p^* = \frac{V}{C} = \frac{60}{150} = 0.400. The Dove frequency is 1−p∗=1−0.400=0.6001 - p^* = 1 - 0.400 = 0.600.

03

In an animal conflict model, contested food has value V=80 fitness unitsV = 80\text{ fitness units}. If researchers observe that natural selection maintains aggressive Hawks at an equilibrium frequency of p∗=0.20p^* = 0.20, what is the average fitness cost of injury (CC) during escalated fights?

Answer

C=400 fitness unitsC = 400\text{ fitness units}. Rearrange p∗=VCp^* = \frac{V}{C} to solve for cost: C=Vp∗=800.20=400 fitness unitsC = \frac{V}{p^*} = \frac{80}{0.20} = 400\text{ fitness units}.

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