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Two behavioral phenotypes exist in a population of male side-blotched lizards competing for territory: aggressive territorial defenders ('Hawks') and display-only ritualizers ('Doves'). When two individuals contest a breeding rock worth a fitness value of , two Doves resolve the contest peacefully such that each gains an average payoff of . If a Hawk encounters a Dove, the Hawk claims the territory, gaining while the Dove gets . When two Hawks contest the territory, they fight until serious injury occurs, yielding an expected payoff of , where represents the fitness cost of injury. Natural selection establishes an evolutionarily stable mixed equilibrium where the frequency of Hawks is whenever . Determine the exact critical threshold value of injury cost below which the Hawk strategy becomes an evolutionarily stable pure strategy (), and calculate the equilibrium frequency of Hawks when .
Answer and steps
Final answer
Critical threshold cost (or ), and at , the equilibrium frequency of Hawks is .
Steps
Understanding the Evolutionary Dynamics of the Hawk-Dove Contest
In evolutionary game theory, the fitness payoff of each behavioral strategy depends on the frequency of other strategies in the population:
- Dove against Dove: Resolves peacefully without injury, sharing the breeding rock equally:
- Hawk against Dove: The Hawk takes the resource uncontested:
- Hawk against Hawk: Both fight until one is injured:
Determining the Critical Threshold Cost ()
A strategy is an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) in pure form if no mutant or alternative strategy can invade a population consisting entirely of that type.
For a population of pure Hawks () to be stable against invasion by Doves:
- An invading Dove receives .
- A resident Hawk encounters other Hawks and receives .
For pure Hawk to be stable (), a Hawk must perform at least as well as an invading Dove:
When the injury cost is strictly less than or equal to the resource value , the cost of fighting never outweighs the prize, so aggressive territorial defense always pays off.
Given , the critical threshold cost below which Hawk becomes a pure ESS is:
(Below or at , .)
Calculating the Equilibrium Frequency When
When the cost of injury exceeds the value of the territory (), fighting becomes dangerous enough that a pure Hawk population is vulnerable to invasion by peaceful Doves. Selection then maintains a balanced polymorphism (mixed ESS) where the average payoffs of Hawks and Doves are equalized:
Substitute the given values into the equilibrium formula:
Thus, at an injury cost of , natural selection stabilizes the population at Hawks and Doves.
Pitfall to Avoid
A common error is confusing the payoff of sharing the resource () with the full resource value () when setting the invasion threshold. The critical condition for an invading Dove is compared against (the payoff of a Dove facing a Hawk), not against , leading directly to .
Typical errors
01 The student inverts the ratio in the frequency formula by computing C/V instead of V/C.
Sample Student Work
Reviewed by ACEpath TeacherStep-by-Step Review
Walk Through It with Your Teacher- Step 1
- Step 2Correct
You inverted the equilibrium ratio by calculating instead of . Because represents an allele or phenotype frequency in the population, it must lie between and .
WHAT YOU DID WELL
Compliments from Your TeacherYou correctly identified that the critical cost threshold occurs where .
You stated the correct numerical value and units for .
THE ERROR
Where Your ACEpath Teacher Spotted the Mistakeno
WHY IT HAPPENED
ACEpath Teacher's DiagnosisYou inverted the formula for the mixed ESS frequency by writing instead of , and did not perform a boundary check that a population frequency must satisfy .
REASONING PATH
Your ACEpath teacher’s suggested approach- Bounded Frequency Check
Any population frequency or proportion must satisfy .
Whenever you calculate an equilibrium frequency, immediately check whether your result exceeds .
- Equilibrium Ratio Logic
When the cost of fighting increases (), fighting becomes less advantageous, so the frequency of aggressive Hawks must decrease ().
Confirm that the variable representing cost () is in the denominator so that higher costs reduce aggressive behavior.
CORRECTED PATH
ACEpath Teacher's DemonstrationRecall the mixed ESS formula given in the problem: for .
Substitute the resource value and injury cost : .
Simplify the fraction: .
,
02 The student uses the half-payoff value V/2 = 20 instead of the total territory value V = 40 in the formulas.
Sample Student Work
Reviewed by ACEpath TeacherStep-by-Step Review
Walk Through It with Your Teacher- Step 1Correct
You set the equilibrium frequency equal to to find the pure-strategy boundary, which is the right conceptual condition. However, the equilibrium frequency given in the problem is , not . Substituting the total resource value gives .
- Step 2Correct
You correctly set up the ratio with in the denominator, but you used in the numerator rather than . Using gives .
WHAT YOU DID WELL
Compliments from Your TeacherYou correctly identified that the pure Hawk ESS threshold occurs where .
You correctly substituted the cost value into the denominator.
You accurately executed the arithmetic division .
THE ERROR
Where Your ACEpath Teacher Spotted the Mistakeno
WHY IT HAPPENED
ACEpath Teacher's DiagnosisYou confused the average shared payoff between two peaceful Doves () with the total fitness value of the contested territory (). In the Hawk-Dove model, the full value of winning the contested territory is , which appears directly in the numerator of the mixed-ESS formula .
REASONING PATH
Your ACEpath teacher’s suggested approach- Identify Total Resource Value vs. Shared Payoff
In contest competition models, represents the full value of monopolizing the resource, while is merely the average payoff when two non-aggressive competitors share it.
Check whether the model formula calls for the total prize value or an interaction-specific payoff.
- Verify the Given ESS Formula
When a question specifies , use the stated variable directly rather than modifying it to .
Reread the problem statement to confirm the exact definition of variables in the equilibrium expression.
CORRECTED PATH
ACEpath Teacher's DemonstrationIdentify the total resource value: .
Set the equilibrium frequency to to find the critical boundary: .
Calculate the equilibrium frequency when : .
, and
03 The student misinterprets the Hawk-Hawk payoff expression (V - C)/2 = 0 as the condition for a pure Hawk ESS, resulting in C_crit = V/2.
Sample Student Work
Reviewed by ACEpath TeacherStep-by-Step Review
Walk Through It with Your Teacher- Step 1Correct
You correctly set the resident Hawk payoff equal to the invader Dove payoff of , but multiplying both sides of by gives , which yields , not .
- Step 2
WHAT YOU DID WELL
Compliments from Your TeacherYou correctly used the mixed ESS frequency formula to find the equilibrium frequency in part (b).
You correctly identified that pure Hawk stability occurs at the boundary where the Hawk-Hawk payoff equals the payoff of an invading Dove ().
THE ERROR
Where Your ACEpath Teacher Spotted the MistakeYou divided by when clearing the fraction in , arriving at instead of .
WHY IT HAPPENED
ACEpath Teacher's DiagnosisWhen isolating from , you carried the denominator over to as a division rather than clearing it by multiplying both sides by (or setting the numerator directly to zero). Alternatively, setting directly demonstrates that the boundary occurs when .
REASONING PATH
Your ACEpath teacher’s suggested approach- Clearing denominators in zero-product expressions
For any fraction with , multiply both sides by to obtain , which means .
Multiply the entire equation by the denominator before isolating the variable.
- Boundary condition check via $p^*$
The pure Hawk strategy boundary is defined by .
Check your critical cost by setting , which confirms .
CORRECTED PATH
ACEpath Teacher's DemonstrationMultiply both sides by :
Add to both sides:
Substitute :
(or ),
Lock it in
In a classic Hawk-Dove game with , what is the formula for the equilibrium frequency of Hawks ()?
. Memory cue: as the cost of injury () increases, the proportion of Hawks must drop, placing in the denominator.
Similar question
In a population of spiders contesting webs worth , aggressive fighters incur an injury cost of when fighting each other. Calculate the evolutionarily stable frequency of aggressive fighters ().
Answer
. Use the mixed ESS formula .
Two red deer stags compete for a mating territory of value . Escalated fights carry an injury cost of . Determine the equilibrium proportion of peaceful displayers (Doves) in this population.
Answer
Proportion of Doves is . First, find the Hawk frequency: . The Dove frequency is .
In an animal conflict model, contested food has value . If researchers observe that natural selection maintains aggressive Hawks at an equilibrium frequency of , what is the average fitness cost of injury () during escalated fights?
Answer
. Rearrange to solve for cost: .