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Two foraging shorebirds compete for patchy polychaete worms on an intertidal mudflat using an idealized Hawk-Dove game. An uncontested worm patch provides a fitness payoff of calories. When two 'Hawks' interact, they engage in an aggressive physical fight resulting in an injury cost of calories, yielding an expected payoff of . When a Hawk meets a 'Dove', the Hawk secures the entire patch ( calories) without injury, while the Dove gets calories. Two Doves divide the patch peacefully without cost, yielding calories each. Determine the critical threshold value of the fighting injury cost below which aggressive 'Hawk' behavior becomes an uninvadable pure Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS), such that .
Answer and steps
Final answer
calories (for any calories, Hawk is a pure ESS; when calories, the ESS is a mixed strategy where Hawk frequency is ).
Steps
Understanding the Hawk-Dove Payoff Matrix
In evolutionary game theory, an Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS) is a behavioral strategy that, once adopted by most members of a population, cannot be invaded by any alternative mutant strategy.
From the problem description, let be the energetic value of the resource () and be the cost of injury from a fight:
- When a Hawk encounters another Hawk, both escalate. Each has an equal chance of winning the resource () or incurring the injury cost ():
- When a Dove encounters a Hawk, the Dove retreats immediately without injury and obtains nothing:
- When a Hawk encounters a Dove, the Hawk takes the entire uncontested resource without injury:
- When two Doves meet, they share the resource peacefully without fighting:
Condition for Hawk to be a Pure ESS
For a strategy to be an uninvadable pure ESS, a population playing that strategy must receive a higher expected payoff against itself than any rare mutant strategy attempting to invade it:
Substitute the payoff expressions into this inequality:
Multiply both sides by :
Calculating the Critical Threshold
Substitute the given value :
Thus, the critical threshold value is:
- When (): The benefit of winning the food patch outweighs the potential cost of injury (). Hawk behavior yields a positive net payoff even when fighting other Hawks, making aggressive "Hawk" behavior an uninvadable pure ESS.
- When (): Mutual fighting yields a negative expected payoff (). In this regime, pure Hawk can be invaded by Dove, leading to a stable mixed polymorphism where the proportion of Hawks in the population is:
Typical errors
01 The student confuses the payoff of a Dove facing a Hawk with the payoff of two Doves sharing the patch, setting (V - C)/2 > V/2 instead of (V - C)/2 > 0.
Sample Student Work
Reviewed by ACEpath TeacherStep-by-Step Review
Walk Through It with Your Teacher- Step 1Correct
To test whether Hawk is an uninvadable pure ESS, a rare invading mutant Dove must perform worse against the resident population than residents perform against themselves. Because the population is almost entirely Hawks, the mutant encounters Hawks, so its payoff is , not .
- Step 2Correct
Your algebraic simplification was consistent with your equation, but the threshold of resulted from setting the right-hand side to instead of .
WHAT YOU DID WELL
Compliments from Your TeacherYou correctly recalled the algebraic formula for .
You solved your linear inequality correctly step by step.
THE ERROR
Where Your ACEpath Teacher Spotted the MistakeYou substituted on the right side instead of the mutant payoff against a resident Hawk, .
WHY IT HAPPENED
ACEpath Teacher's DiagnosisConflating the payoff of a mutant interacting with other mutants with the payoff of a mutant interacting with the resident population. In an ESS invasion scenario, the rare mutant encounters residents almost exclusively.
REASONING PATH
Your ACEpath teacher’s suggested approach- Identify the Resident and the Mutant
In an ESS analysis, the resident strategy forms almost of the population, and the mutant is infinitely rare.
Always evaluate the mutant's payoff against the resident strategy: .
- Apply the Pure ESS Condition
Strategy is a pure ESS if for any alternative strategy .
Set the resident-resident payoff strictly greater than the mutant-resident payoff: .
CORRECTED PATH
ACEpath Teacher's DemonstrationSet up the ESS condition comparing the resident Hawk to an invading Dove facing a resident Hawk: .
Substitute the given payoffs into the inequality: .
Multiply both sides by : , which gives .
Identify the upper bound of injury cost as the critical threshold: .
02 The student forgets that the injury cost is subtracted and instead writes the net payoff as (V + C)/2, concluding that Hawk is always an ESS.
Sample Student Work
Reviewed by ACEpath TeacherStep-by-Step Review
Walk Through It with Your Teacher- Step 1
- Step 2Correct
You substituted instead of . Because fighting incurs an injury cost, reduces fitness and must be subtracted from the resource benefit .
- Step 3Correct
Solving gives , so the critical threshold is .
WHAT YOU DID WELL
Compliments from Your TeacherYou correctly stated the formal ESS uninvadability inequality .
THE ERROR
Where Your ACEpath Teacher Spotted the MistakeYou used an addition sign instead of subtracting the injury cost when substituting the Hawk-Hawk payoff.
WHY IT HAPPENED
ACEpath Teacher's DiagnosisConfusing the sign of an energetic cost in fitness payoff functions; costs represent fitness penalties and must be subtracted from gains ().
REASONING PATH
Your ACEpath teacher’s suggested approach- Payoff Net Value Rule
Net fitness payoff = . In a Hawk-Hawk encounter with equal winning probability: .
Always verify that costs entered into game payoff expressions carry a negative sign relative to energetic benefits.
- Biological Feasibility Check
Costs and resource values are non-negative physical quantities (, ).
If a critical threshold for cost results in a negative value such as , check the sign of in the initial equation.
CORRECTED PATH
ACEpath Teacher's DemonstrationSubstitute and into the inequality: .
Multiply both sides by : .
Rearrange to solve for : .
03 The student misinterprets the condition for Hawk to be an ESS by setting E(Hawk, Hawk) equal to the payoff of a Hawk facing a Dove, (V - C)/2 > V.
Sample Student Work
Reviewed by ACEpath TeacherStep-by-Step Review
Walk Through It with Your Teacher- Step 1
E(, ) > E(, )
CorrectTo test if Hawk is an uninvadable pure ESS against an invading rare Dove mutant, you must compare how a resident Hawk performs against another resident Hawk versus how a mutant Dove performs against a resident Hawk, which gives .
- Step 2
> 40 40 - C > 80
CorrectBecause rather than , the inequality compares to instead of .
- Step 3
C^* = -40
Correct(Hawk is pure ESS for )
Solving yields , giving a critical threshold of rather than a negative cost.
WHAT YOU DID WELL
Compliments from Your TeacherYou correctly identified the formula for the mutual Hawk payoff as .
You solved the algebraic inequalities with correct arithmetic steps.
THE ERROR
Where Your ACEpath Teacher Spotted the MistakeIn attempt (b), you correctly wrote and solved , but labeled it as and then reverted to in part (c).
WHY IT HAPPENED
ACEpath Teacher's DiagnosisYou confused the opponent and the player when evaluating the invasion condition for an Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS). In a population of resident Hawks, an invading mutant strategy is Dove, so the mutant encounters resident Hawks and earns , not .
REASONING PATH
Your ACEpath teacher’s suggested approach- Identify Resident vs. Mutant Payoffs
For strategy to be an uninvadable pure ESS against mutant , a resident playing another resident must outperform a mutant playing a resident: .
Always set the opponent as the resident strategy on both sides of the inequality, placing the resident on the left and the rare mutant on the right.
CORRECTED PATH
ACEpath Teacher's DemonstrationSet up the ESS condition from the problem statement: .
Substitute the payoff values: .
Multiply both sides by : .
Isolate : .
(Hawk is a pure ESS when )
Lock it in
In evolutionary game theory, what encounter determines whether a rare mutant strategy can invade a resident population ?
The encounter between the mutant and the resident, , because rare mutants almost exclusively meet residents.
Similar question
Two animals compete for a food territory worth in a standard Hawk-Dove game. The cost of serious injury is . Can a rare Dove mutant invade a resident population of pure Hawks?
Answer
Yes. , whereas . Because , rare Doves earn higher fitness and successfully invade.
In a modified Hawk-Dove game, a patch provides . When a Dove meets a Hawk, the Dove displays briefly before retreating, costing the Dove of energy while yielding resource. Find the critical injury cost below which pure Hawk is an uninvadable ESS.
Answer
. For Hawk to be an uninvadable ESS, . Here and . Setting yields .
In a population where Dove is the resident strategy and Hawk is a rare mutant, two Doves share a resource peacefully, while a Hawk takes the whole patch from a Dove. Can pure Dove ever be an ESS against Hawk? Explain using the ESS inequality.
Answer
No. A mutant Hawk against resident Doves receives , whereas resident Doves receive . Since for any , mutant Hawks can always invade a pure Dove population.