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Two foraging shorebirds compete for patchy polychaete worms on an intertidal mudflat using an idealized Hawk-Dove game. An uncontested worm patch provides a fitness payoff of V=40V = 40 calories. When two 'Hawks' interact, they engage in an aggressive physical fight resulting in an injury cost of CC calories, yielding an expected payoff of E(Hawk,Hawk)=V−C2E(\text{Hawk}, \text{Hawk}) = \frac{V - C}{2}. When a Hawk meets a 'Dove', the Hawk secures the entire patch (4040 calories) without injury, while the Dove gets 00 calories. Two Doves divide the patch peacefully without cost, yielding 2020 calories each. Determine the critical threshold value of the fighting injury cost C∗C^* below which aggressive 'Hawk' behavior becomes an uninvadable pure Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS), such that E(Hawk,Hawk)>E(Dove,Hawk)E(\text{Hawk}, \text{Hawk}) > E(\text{Dove}, \text{Hawk}).

Answer and steps

Final answer

C∗=40C^* = 40 calories (for any C<40C < 40 calories, Hawk is a pure ESS; when C>40C > 40 calories, the ESS is a mixed strategy where Hawk frequency is p=VCp = \frac{V}{C}).

Steps

01

Understanding the Hawk-Dove Payoff Matrix

In evolutionary game theory, an Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS) is a behavioral strategy that, once adopted by most members of a population, cannot be invaded by any alternative mutant strategy.

From the problem description, let VV be the energetic value of the resource (V=40 caloriesV = 40\text{ calories}) and CC be the cost of injury from a fight:

  • When a Hawk encounters another Hawk, both escalate. Each has an equal chance of winning the resource (+V+V) or incurring the injury cost (−C-C): E(Hawk,Hawk)=V−C2E(\text{Hawk}, \text{Hawk}) = \frac{V - C}{2}
  • When a Dove encounters a Hawk, the Dove retreats immediately without injury and obtains nothing: E(Dove,Hawk)=0E(\text{Dove}, \text{Hawk}) = 0
  • When a Hawk encounters a Dove, the Hawk takes the entire uncontested resource without injury: E(Hawk,Dove)=VE(\text{Hawk}, \text{Dove}) = V
  • When two Doves meet, they share the resource peacefully without fighting: E(Dove,Dove)=V2E(\text{Dove}, \text{Dove}) = \frac{V}{2}

02

Condition for Hawk to be a Pure ESS

For a strategy to be an uninvadable pure ESS, a population playing that strategy must receive a higher expected payoff against itself than any rare mutant strategy attempting to invade it: E(Hawk,Hawk)>E(Dove,Hawk)E(\text{Hawk}, \text{Hawk}) > E(\text{Dove}, \text{Hawk})

Substitute the payoff expressions into this inequality: V−C2>0\frac{V - C}{2} > 0

Multiply both sides by 22: V−C>0  ⟹  C<VV - C > 0 \implies C < V


03

Calculating the Critical Threshold C∗C^*

Substitute the given value V=40 caloriesV = 40\text{ calories}: C<40 caloriesC < 40\text{ calories}

Thus, the critical threshold value is: C∗=40 caloriesC^* = 40\text{ calories}

  • When C<C∗C < C^* (C<40 caloriesC < 40\text{ calories}): The benefit of winning the food patch outweighs the potential cost of injury (V>CV > C). Hawk behavior yields a positive net payoff even when fighting other Hawks, making aggressive "Hawk" behavior an uninvadable pure ESS.
  • When C>C∗C > C^* (C>40 caloriesC > 40\text{ calories}): Mutual fighting yields a negative expected payoff (V−C2<0\frac{V - C}{2} < 0). In this regime, pure Hawk can be invaded by Dove, leading to a stable mixed polymorphism where the proportion of Hawks in the population is: p=VCp = \frac{V}{C}

Typical errors

OverviewACEpath Teacher's Diagnosis

01 The student confuses the payoff of a Dove facing a Hawk with the payoff of two Doves sharing the patch, setting (V - C)/2 > V/2 instead of (V - C)/2 > 0.

Sample Student Work

Reviewed by ACEpath Teacher
Step-by-Step Review
Walk Through It with Your Teacher
Incorrect
  1. Step 1

    E(Hawk,Hawk)>E(Dove,Dove)  ⟹  40−C2>20E(\text{Hawk}, \text{Hawk}) > E(\text{Dove}, \text{Dove}) \implies \frac{40 - C}{2} > 20

    Correct

    E(Hawk,Hawk)>E(Dove,Hawk)  ⟹  40−C2>0E(\text{Hawk}, \text{Hawk}) > E(\text{Dove}, \text{Hawk}) \implies \frac{40 - C}{2} > 0

    To test whether Hawk is an uninvadable pure ESS, a rare invading mutant Dove must perform worse against the resident population than residents perform against themselves. Because the population is almost entirely Hawks, the mutant encounters Hawks, so its payoff is E(Dove,Hawk)=0E(\text{Dove}, \text{Hawk}) = 0, not E(Dove,Dove)=20E(\text{Dove}, \text{Dove}) = 20.

  2. Step 2

    40−C>40  ⟹  C∗=0 calories40 - C > 40 \implies C^* = 0\text{ calories}

    Correct

    40−C>0  ⟹  C<40  ⟹  C∗=40 calories40 - C > 0 \implies C < 40 \implies C^* = 40\text{ calories}

    Your algebraic simplification was consistent with your equation, but the threshold of 0 calories0\text{ calories} resulted from setting the right-hand side to 2020 instead of 00.

WHAT YOU DID WELL
Compliments from Your Teacher

You correctly recalled the algebraic formula for E(Hawk,Hawk)=40−C2E(\text{Hawk}, \text{Hawk}) = \frac{40 - C}{2}.

You solved your linear inequality correctly step by step.

THE ERROR
Where Your ACEpath Teacher Spotted the Mistake
Incorrect payoff comparison for mutant invasion

You substituted E(Dove,Dove)=20E(\text{Dove}, \text{Dove}) = 20 on the right side instead of the mutant payoff against a resident Hawk, E(Dove,Hawk)=0E(\text{Dove}, \text{Hawk}) = 0.

WHY IT HAPPENED
ACEpath Teacher's Diagnosis

Conflating the payoff of a mutant interacting with other mutants with the payoff of a mutant interacting with the resident population. In an ESS invasion scenario, the rare mutant encounters residents almost exclusively.

REASONING PATH
Your ACEpath teacher’s suggested approach
Identify the Resident and the Mutant
  • In an ESS analysis, the resident strategy forms almost 100%100\% of the population, and the mutant is infinitely rare.

  • Always evaluate the mutant's payoff against the resident strategy: E(Mutant,Resident)E(\text{Mutant}, \text{Resident}).

Apply the Pure ESS Condition
  • Strategy II is a pure ESS if E(I,I)>E(J,I)E(I, I) > E(J, I) for any alternative strategy JJ.

  • Set the resident-resident payoff strictly greater than the mutant-resident payoff: E(Hawk,Hawk)>E(Dove,Hawk)E(\text{Hawk}, \text{Hawk}) > E(\text{Dove}, \text{Hawk}).

CORRECTED PATH
ACEpath Teacher's Demonstration
  1. Set up the ESS condition comparing the resident Hawk to an invading Dove facing a resident Hawk: E(Hawk,Hawk)>E(Dove,Hawk)E(\text{Hawk}, \text{Hawk}) > E(\text{Dove}, \text{Hawk}).

  2. Substitute the given payoffs into the inequality: 40−C2>0\frac{40 - C}{2} > 0.

  3. Multiply both sides by 22: 40−C>040 - C > 0, which gives C<40C < 40.

  4. Identify the upper bound of injury cost as the critical threshold: C∗=40 caloriesC^* = 40\text{ calories}.

Final answer

C∗=40 caloriesC^* = 40\text{ calories}

NEXT STEPS
Final Takeaways from Your Teacher
  • Review the definition of an Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS) focusing on why rare mutants only interact with common residents.

  • Practice writing out the payoff matrix and identifying E(Strategy A,Strategy B)E(\text{Strategy A}, \text{Strategy B}) before forming inequalities.

OverviewACEpath Teacher's Diagnosis

02 The student forgets that the injury cost is subtracted and instead writes the net payoff as (V + C)/2, concluding that Hawk is always an ESS.

Sample Student Work

Reviewed by ACEpath Teacher
Step-by-Step Review
Walk Through It with Your Teacher
Incorrect
  1. Step 1

    E(Hawk,Hawk)>E(Dove,Hawk)E(\text{Hawk}, \text{Hawk}) > E(\text{Dove}, \text{Hawk})

  2. Step 2

    (40+C)/2>0  ⟹  40+C>0(40 + C)/2 > 0 \implies 40 + C > 0

    Correct

    40−C2>0  ⟹  40−C>0\frac{40 - C}{2} > 0 \implies 40 - C > 0

    You substituted (40+C)/2(40 + C)/2 instead of (40−C)/2(40 - C)/2. Because fighting incurs an injury cost, CC reduces fitness and must be subtracted from the resource benefit VV.

  3. Step 3

    C∗=−40 caloriesC^* = -40\text{ calories}

    Correct

    C∗=40 caloriesC^* = 40\text{ calories}

    Solving 40−C>040 - C > 0 gives C<40C < 40, so the critical threshold is C∗=40 caloriesC^* = 40\text{ calories}.

WHAT YOU DID WELL
Compliments from Your Teacher

You correctly stated the formal ESS uninvadability inequality E(Hawk,Hawk)>E(Dove,Hawk)E(\text{Hawk}, \text{Hawk}) > E(\text{Dove}, \text{Hawk}).

THE ERROR
Where Your ACEpath Teacher Spotted the Mistake
Payoff Sign Error

You used an addition sign (40+C)(40 + C) instead of subtracting the injury cost (40−C)(40 - C) when substituting the Hawk-Hawk payoff.

WHY IT HAPPENED
ACEpath Teacher's Diagnosis

Confusing the sign of an energetic cost in fitness payoff functions; costs represent fitness penalties and must be subtracted from gains (V−CV - C).

REASONING PATH
Your ACEpath teacher’s suggested approach
Payoff Net Value Rule
  • Net fitness payoff = Benefit−Cost\text{Benefit} - \text{Cost}. In a Hawk-Hawk encounter with equal winning probability: E(Hawk,Hawk)=V−C2E(\text{Hawk}, \text{Hawk}) = \frac{V - C}{2}.

  • Always verify that costs entered into game payoff expressions carry a negative sign relative to energetic benefits.

Biological Feasibility Check
  • Costs and resource values are non-negative physical quantities (V≥0V \ge 0, C≥0C \ge 0).

  • If a critical threshold for cost results in a negative value such as −40 calories-40\text{ calories}, check the sign of CC in the initial equation.

CORRECTED PATH
ACEpath Teacher's Demonstration
  1. Substitute E(Hawk,Hawk)=40−C2E(\text{Hawk}, \text{Hawk}) = \frac{40 - C}{2} and E(Dove,Hawk)=0E(\text{Dove}, \text{Hawk}) = 0 into the inequality: 40−C2>0\frac{40 - C}{2} > 0.

  2. Multiply both sides by 22: 40−C>040 - C > 0.

  3. Rearrange to solve for CC: C<40 caloriesC < 40\text{ calories}.

Final answer

C∗=40 caloriesC^* = 40\text{ calories}

NEXT STEPS
Final Takeaways from Your Teacher
  • Review the signs of benefits versus costs in evolutionary game theory matrices.

  • Practice solving the Hawk-Dove game under both pure ESS conditions (C<VC < V) and mixed ESS conditions (C>VC > V).

OverviewACEpath Teacher's Diagnosis

03 The student misinterprets the condition for Hawk to be an ESS by setting E(Hawk, Hawk) equal to the payoff of a Hawk facing a Dove, (V - C)/2 > V.

Sample Student Work

Reviewed by ACEpath Teacher
Step-by-Step Review
Walk Through It with Your Teacher
Incorrect
  1. Step 1

    E(Hawk\text{Hawk}, Hawk\text{Hawk}) > E(Hawk\text{Hawk}, Dove\text{Dove})

    Correct

    E(Hawk,Hawk)>E(Dove,Hawk)E(\text{Hawk}, \text{Hawk}) > E(\text{Dove}, \text{Hawk})

    To test if Hawk is an uninvadable pure ESS against an invading rare Dove mutant, you must compare how a resident Hawk performs against another resident Hawk versus how a mutant Dove performs against a resident Hawk, which gives E(Hawk,Hawk)>E(Dove,Hawk)E(\text{Hawk}, \text{Hawk}) > E(\text{Dove}, \text{Hawk}).

  2. Step 2

    40−C2\frac{40 - C}{2} > 40   ⟹  \implies 40 - C > 80

    Correct

    40−C2>0  ⟹  40−C>0\frac{40 - C}{2} > 0 \implies 40 - C > 0

    Because E(Dove,Hawk)=0E(\text{Dove}, \text{Hawk}) = 0 rather than 4040, the inequality compares 40−C2\frac{40-C}{2} to 00 instead of 4040.

  3. Step 3

    C^* = -40 calories\text{ calories}

    Correct

    C∗=40 caloriesC^* = 40\text{ calories} (Hawk is pure ESS for C<40C < 40)

    Solving 40−C2>0\frac{40-C}{2} > 0 yields C<40C < 40, giving a critical threshold of C∗=40 caloriesC^* = 40\text{ calories} rather than a negative cost.

WHAT YOU DID WELL
Compliments from Your Teacher

You correctly identified the formula for the mutual Hawk payoff as 40−C2\frac{40 - C}{2}.

You solved the algebraic inequalities with correct arithmetic steps.

THE ERROR
Where Your ACEpath Teacher Spotted the Mistake
Incorrect ESS Invasion Condition Setup

In attempt (b), you correctly wrote and solved 40−C2>0  ⟹  C<40\frac{40-C}{2} > 0 \implies C < 40, but labeled it as E(Dove,Hawk)>E(Dove,Dove)E(\text{Dove}, \text{Hawk}) > E(\text{Dove}, \text{Dove}) and then reverted to C∗=−40 caloriesC^* = -40\text{ calories} in part (c).

WHY IT HAPPENED
ACEpath Teacher's Diagnosis

You confused the opponent and the player when evaluating the invasion condition for an Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS). In a population of resident Hawks, an invading mutant strategy is Dove, so the mutant encounters resident Hawks and earns E(Dove,Hawk)=0E(\text{Dove}, \text{Hawk}) = 0, not E(Hawk,Dove)=40E(\text{Hawk}, \text{Dove}) = 40.

REASONING PATH
Your ACEpath teacher’s suggested approach
Identify Resident vs. Mutant Payoffs
  • For strategy II to be an uninvadable pure ESS against mutant JJ, a resident playing another resident must outperform a mutant playing a resident: E(I,I)>E(J,I)E(I, I) > E(J, I).

  • Always set the opponent as the resident strategy on both sides of the inequality, placing the resident on the left and the rare mutant on the right.

CORRECTED PATH
ACEpath Teacher's Demonstration
  1. Set up the ESS condition from the problem statement: E(Hawk,Hawk)>E(Dove,Hawk)E(\text{Hawk}, \text{Hawk}) > E(\text{Dove}, \text{Hawk}).

  2. Substitute the payoff values: 40−C2>0\frac{40 - C}{2} > 0.

  3. Multiply both sides by 22: 40−C>040 - C > 0.

  4. Isolate CC: C<40C < 40.

Final answer

C∗=40 caloriesC^* = 40\text{ calories} (Hawk is a pure ESS when C<40 caloriesC < 40\text{ calories})

NEXT STEPS
Final Takeaways from Your Teacher
  • Review the two conditions for an Evolutionary Stable Strategy (E(I,I)>E(J,I)E(I, I) > E(J, I), or if E(I,I)=E(J,I)E(I, I) = E(J, I), then E(I,J)>E(J,J)E(I, J) > E(J, J)).

  • Practice reading payoff matrices by clearly distinguishing the focal player (row) from the opponent (column).

Lock it in

Similar question

01

Two animals compete for a food territory worth V=60 caloriesV = 60\text{ calories} in a standard Hawk-Dove game. The cost of serious injury is C=100 caloriesC = 100\text{ calories}. Can a rare Dove mutant invade a resident population of pure Hawks?

Answer

Yes. E(Hawk,Hawk)=60−1002=−20 caloriesE(\text{Hawk}, \text{Hawk}) = \frac{60 - 100}{2} = -20\text{ calories}, whereas E(Dove,Hawk)=0 caloriesE(\text{Dove}, \text{Hawk}) = 0\text{ calories}. Because E(Dove,Hawk)>E(Hawk,Hawk)E(\text{Dove}, \text{Hawk}) > E(\text{Hawk}, \text{Hawk}), rare Doves earn higher fitness and successfully invade.

02

In a modified Hawk-Dove game, a patch provides V=50 unitsV = 50\text{ units}. When a Dove meets a Hawk, the Dove displays briefly before retreating, costing the Dove d=5 unitsd = 5\text{ units} of energy while yielding 00 resource. Find the critical injury cost C∗C^* below which pure Hawk is an uninvadable ESS.

Answer

C∗=60 unitsC^* = 60\text{ units}. For Hawk to be an uninvadable ESS, E(Hawk,Hawk)>E(Dove,Hawk)E(\text{Hawk}, \text{Hawk}) > E(\text{Dove}, \text{Hawk}). Here E(Dove,Hawk)=−5E(\text{Dove}, \text{Hawk}) = -5 and E(Hawk,Hawk)=50−C2E(\text{Hawk}, \text{Hawk}) = \frac{50 - C}{2}. Setting 50−C2>−5\frac{50 - C}{2} > -5 yields 50−C>−10  ⟹  C<60 units50 - C > -10 \implies C < 60\text{ units}.

03

In a population where Dove is the resident strategy and Hawk is a rare mutant, two Doves share a resource V=80 caloriesV = 80\text{ calories} peacefully, while a Hawk takes the whole patch from a Dove. Can pure Dove ever be an ESS against Hawk? Explain using the ESS inequality.

Answer

No. A mutant Hawk against resident Doves receives E(Hawk,Dove)=V=80 caloriesE(\text{Hawk}, \text{Dove}) = V = 80\text{ calories}, whereas resident Doves receive E(Dove,Dove)=V2=40 caloriesE(\text{Dove}, \text{Dove}) = \frac{V}{2} = 40\text{ calories}. Since E(Hawk,Dove)>E(Dove,Dove)E(\text{Hawk}, \text{Dove}) > E(\text{Dove}, \text{Dove}) for any V>0V > 0, mutant Hawks can always invade a pure Dove population.

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